III. Whether the Father and the Son are one Inspiriter or two Inspiriters

42. Connected to this question [n.1] is a quasi-grammatical difficulty: whether the Father and the Son might be called one inspiriter or two inspiriters.

Here the thing is said in many ways, but because the force of the question is about the signification of a name, I do not delay over it much. For it seems that such a verbal name [sc. ‘inspiriter’] signifies such a principle of acting, as it is of a nature to denominate an active supposit; for just as ‘reading’ signifies an act quidditatively by way of habit and rest, so ‘reader’ signifies the principle of this sort of act by way of habit and rest as it is denominative of an active supposit; ‘inspiriting’ therefore signifies the force of inspiriting as it concerns the supposit - and because there is one force in the Father and the Son, and a numerical term attached to some determinable places on it its own signification, it does not therefore seem one should, as to the force of the word, concede that there are two inspiriters, because the inspiriting force would seem to be enumerated in these words.

43. And if you object that this inference follows ‘there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters’ (the proof of the consequence is that just as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural), - I reply: I say that the consequence is not valid, because a participle signifies the act in its being done, for it co-signifies time as does a verb, - and so, just as it is conceded that the Father and the Son create, thus is it conceded that they are creating; but it is not conceded that they are two creators but one creator, because the verbal name does not signify the act by way of act and in its being done, but by way of habit and rest.

44. But what is the reason for conceding that a numerical term can be attached to adjectival terms but not to substantives?

This reason is posited, that adjectives are added to supposits and signify the form in the thing added to the supposits, and therefore they can be counted by the number of the supposits; but substantives do not thus signify the form in the thing added to the supposits, but they as it were signify in a way that is abstracted from the supposits; therefore they cannot be thus counted, because the number of the form would there be signified, and so it is not conceded that ‘there are two Gods’ as it is conceded that ‘there are two possessing deity’.

45. But this reason does not seem sufficient, because a numerical term puts its signification on the signification of the determinable; but what is signified by an adjective and a substantive is one and the same thing, - and they differ only in mode of signifying; therefore it seems that a numerical term primarily puts its signification on the same thing, and so, if a numbering of the determinable form is signified in one part and not in the other, because of the addition to the supposit that belongs to one and not to the other -then not by reason of the thing signified but by reason of the mode of signifying could there be truth in one and falsehood in the other.

46. I assign another reason of this sort: everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but both would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive.

When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, an independent thing is found, at any rate, where its dependence is terminated, - but when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as when it is said ‘two inspiriters’, at once the numerical adjectival term has a substantive terminating it, because the adjective is determining that which terminates its dependence; therefore the signification of its substantive is denoted as numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when it is said there are ‘two inspiriting’, both are dependent and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third thing which terminates their dependence and is determined by them. And this holds in the proposed case [n.43], ‘somethings’ or ‘persons’, as if to say ‘three somethings’ or ‘three persons’ creating, because although the masculine form is, by usage, not a substantive, but only the neuter form is a substantiveIn Latin the neuter ‘album’ (‘the white’) can be treated as a substantive, but the masculine ‘albus’ (‘a white [man]’) cannot be. ⁴ [I d.5 nn.36, 42], yet in divine reality, when a masculine adjective is set down by itself, it is then understood to be a substantive there, like ‘someone’ or ‘person’; as when it is said ‘the Father and the Son are one’ - as the authorities say [n.47] - , although they are one God, because ‘one’ posited absolutely is signified adjectively and is understood to have its own substantive, that is ‘someone’; hence [by ‘the Father and the Son are one’] is signified that the Father and the Son are one-someone or one-person.

47. Hence, as to this consequence ‘there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters’, - I deny it.

And when you prove it ‘because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural’ [n.43], I say that it is not necessary - if on some antecedent some consequent follows - that on a distinction in the antecedent a distinction in the consequent follows, except when the consequent is distinguished in the antecedents as a genus is distinguished in its species. But in the proposed case the inspiriting supposits are distinguished, and on ‘inspiriting supposit’ there follows ‘inspiriter’, but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing ‘inspiriting, therefore inspiriter, - therefore if there are two inspiriting, then there are two inspiriters’ there is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent. And if it is sometimes found in authors that the Father and the Son are two inspiriters, these authorities should be given an exposition and understood soundly; for many authorities of the saints, which are sometimes not true as to the force of the speech, are to be expounded according to the Master [Lombard] in distinction 12 [Sentences I d.12 ch.2 nn.109-111].